


Articles
(forthcoming). “The Scope of Clinical Ethics: Letting Go of Moral Distress.” American Journal of Bioethics. With Jeremy Butler and Dave Langlois. [Third Author]
(forthcoming). “Should Anti-Natalists Strive to Improve the World?” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry.
(forthcoming). “Ideology and Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe: An Assessment of Lithuania and Romania.” Eastern European Economics. With John A. Parnell, Femi Odebiyi, and Sebastian Vaduv. [Third Author]
(forthcoming). “African Personhood and the (Im)Permissibility of Euthanasia.” Journal of Medicine & Philosophy.
(2025). “Advancing Global Economic Justice in the Face of Race: Mwipikeni’s Critique of Metz’s Reformist Normative Economics.” South Africa Journal of Philosophy. 44 (4): 566–575. With Thaddeus Metz. [First Author]
(2025). “The Afterlife in African Traditional Religion: Notions of Punishment and Immortality.” Journal for the Academic Study of Religion 38 (2): 163-179.
(2025). “Classic Anglo-American Thought Experiments about Abortion and African Communitarianism.” Bioethics 39: 842-849.
(2025). “Cultivating Intellectual Virtues with the Epistemic Benefits of Religious Disagreement.” Philosophia Reformata 90 (2): 145-163.
(2025). “Recent Work in African Normative Theory.” Analysis 85 (3): 793-807.
(2025). “Unfriendly Cases for Metz’s Modal Relational Moral Theory.” Social Theory & Practice 51 (2): 265-279.
(2025). “African Vital Force and the Permissibility of Euthanasia.” Journal of Medical Ethics 51:247-248.
-
Selected to be an issue’s ‘Feature Article’
(2025). “Rescuing the (Open) Theistic Multiverse Against Two Recent Challenges.” Sophia 64 (2): 275-290. With Timothy Blank. [First Author]
(2025). “Unfriendly Cases for Metz’s Modal Relational Moral Theory.” Social Theory & Practice 51 (2): 265-279.
(2025). “On the Argument Against Abortion from African Normative Personhood.” Arụmarụka: Journal of Conversational Thinking 5 (1).
(2025). Benatar and Metz on Cosmic Meaning and Anti-Natalism. The Journal of Value Inquiry 59: 245-261.
(2024). “Liveliness as a Theory of Meaning in Life.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (4): 797- 813.
(2024). “African Liveliness as a Secular Moral Theory: Problems and Prospects.” The Monist 107 (3): 225-236.
(2023). “Future Minds are Not a Challenge to Anti-Natalism: A Reply to Gould.” Bioethics 37 (2): 208-213.
(2023). “Traditional African Religion and Non-Doxastic Accounts of Faith.” Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 12 (2): 33-54.
(2023). “Completing the Complete Understanding Argument: A Rejoinder to Roberto Di Ceglie.” Philosophia 37 (2): 208-213.
(2022). "Toward an African Theory of the Atonement." The Journal of Analytic Theology 10: 200-209.
(2022). "Averroes, Epistemic Paternalism, and Religious Knowledge." With Joshua Harris. Philosophy East and West 72 (4): 960-972. [First Author].
(2022). "Are Atheist Worlds Really the Best?" Religious Studies 58 (2): 345-358.
(2022). "The Axiology of Theism: Problems and Prospects." Philosophy Compass e12826.
(2022). "Molefe on the Value of Community for Personhood." South African Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 28-36.
(2022). "The Epistemic Benefits of Diversifying the Philosophy of Religion." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1): 77-94.
(2022). "God's Choice of a World." Religious Studies Archives 6: 1-12.
(2021). "On Whether there are Grounds for Worship." Philosophia Christi 23 (2): 313-328.
(2021). "No Fault Unbelief Defended: A Reply to Roberto Di Ceglie." Sophia 60 (2): 473-479.
(2021). "Semantic Non-Doxastic Agnostic Religious Faith." Philosophia 49 (3): 1067-1081.
29. (2021). “Epistemic Paternalism, Open Group Inquiry, and Religious Knowledge.” Res Philosophica 98 (2): 1-20.
(2021). "Catherine Elgin on Peerhood and Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement." Synthese 198 (4): 3183-3202.
(2021). "The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement." Social Epistemology 35 (1):85-98.
-
See also Ranalli, Chris. (2020). “Rationally Maintaining a Worldview.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (11): 1-14.
(2020). "Epistemic Elitism, Scepticism, and Diachronic Epistemic Reasons: A Rejoinder to Ranalli on Worldview Disagreement." Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (11): 44-52.
(2020). "Schellenberg's Ultimism as the Proper Object of Non-Doxastic Religion: A Reply to Palmqvist." Sophia 59 (2): 273-284.
(2020). "Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil-God Hypothesis." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1): 173-190.
(2019). “Anti-Theism, Pro-Theism, and Gratuitous Evil.” Philosophia Christi 21 (2): 101-115.
(2019). "On the Will Not to Believe and Axiological Atheism: A Reply to Cockayne and Warman." Sophia 58: 743-175.
(2019). "Disagreement, Deep Time, and Progress in Philosophy." The International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9: 285-313.
(2019). “The Goals of Philosophy of Religion: A Reply to Ireneusz Zieminski.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (1): 187-199.
(2019). “Undermining the Axiological Solution to Divine Hiddenness.” With Perry Hendricks. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 86 (1): 3-15.
(2019). "On How to (Not) to Argue for Preferring the Non-Existence of God." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 58 (4): 677-699.
(2018). “On the Axiology of a Hidden God.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (4): 79-95.
(2018). "Religious Commitment and the Benefits of Cognitive Diversity: A Reply to Trakakis." Sophia 57 (1): 501-513.
(2018). "Recognition and Epistemic Injustice in the Epistemology of Disagreemen." Philosophical Forum 49 (3): 363-377.
(2018). "The Axiological Solution to Divine Hiddenness." Ratio 31 (3): 331-341.
(2018). “Is Religious Experience a Solution to the Problem of Religious Disagreement?” Logos & Episteme IX (2): 173-197.
(2018). “The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements.” Informal Logic 38 (2): 263-292.
(2017). “The Role of Idealized Cases in the Epistemology of Disagreement.” Southwest Philosophy Review (33) 2: 251-270.
(2017). “Anti-Theism and the Objective Meaningful Life Argument.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (56) 2: 337-355.
-
See also Penner, Myron A. (2018). “On the Objective Meaningful Life Argument: A Response to Kirk Lougheed.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (57) 1: 173-182.
(2017). “Indirect Epistemic Reasons and Religious Belief.” With Robert Mark Simpson. Religious Studies (53) 2: 151-169. [First Author]
(2015). “Pro-Theism and the Added Value of Morally Good Agents.” With Myron A. Penner. Philosophia Christi (17) 1: 53-69. [Second Author]
(2014). "Divine Creation, Modal Collapse, and the Theistic Multiverse." Sophia (53) 4: 435-446.